

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USINT BAGHDAD

S E C R E T KUWAIT 2208

LIMDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PFOR, MU, YS, KU
SUBJECT: DHOFAR WAR - PERSPECTIVE FROM KUWAIT

REF: MUSCAT 0585

SUMMARY: EMBASSY KUWAIT WAS IMPRESSED BY THE COMPREHENSIVE
SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS CONCERNING THE WAR IN DHOFAR
CONTAINED IN REFTEL. WITH A VIEW TO BEING HELPFUL IN ANY RE-
ASSESSMENT CONTEMPLATED BY THE DEPARTMENT, OUR VIEWS CONCERNING
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THE BEST STRATEGY FOR THE USG TO FOLLOW IN MOVING TOWARDS RESOLUTION

OF THE CONFLICT ARE OUTLINED BELOW. THEY ARE BASED ON A KUWAITI PERSPECTIVE WHICH SUGGESTS THE PRINCIPLE PROBLEM IS NOT IN OMAN, BUT IN SOUTH YEMEN. WHILE THE USG CAN PLAY ONLY A LIMITED ROLE, WE BELIEVE OUR MAJOR EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE PDRY PROBLEM, RATHER THAN DIRECT SUPPORT OF OMAN IN ITS CONFLICT WITH THE PFLO. KUWAIT CAN PLAY A ROLE. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS DISCUSS WITH AMBASSADOR STOLTZFUS, CURRENTLY IN WASHINGTON, POSSIBLE NEW INITIATIVES, PERHAPS THROUGH THE GOK. END SUMMARY.

1. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN INDO CHINA IS GOING TO INFLUENCE THE ACTIONS OF OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS, INCLUDING THE PFLO. THE OLD DICTUM - "IF A GUERRILLA DOESN'T LOSE HE WINS, IF AN ARMY DOESN'T WIN IT LOSES", WILL IN THE EMBASSY'S JUDGEMENT PREVAIL. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF PFLO AND PDRY TO KEEP THE DHOFAR "WAR" ALIVE AND KEEP FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON OMAN UNTIL IMAN TIRES AND STARTS TO TALK OF NEGOTIATION. IF THE PFLO OR SOME FRONT GROUP CAN GAIN SOME LEGITIMACY THROUGH NEGOTIATION, IT HAS WON.

2. AS LONG AS THE PFLO HAS A SANCTUARY (PDRY), AND AS LONG AS IT CAN LAY A MINE OR SNIPE AT THE SAF, IT IS STILL ACTIVE. THE THEORY OF "CONTAINING" GUERRILLAS HAS TOO OFTEN BEEN DISPROVED. WHETHER A MOVEMENT HAS BEEN CONTAINED DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE VIEW OF A MILITARY COMMANDER, BUT ON THE PEOPLE WHOM THE MOVEMENT WISHES TO INFLUENCE. IF THEY FEEL THE MOVEMENT IS STILL ALIVE, IT IS.

3. IN OUR VIEW THE KEY IS THE PDRY, NOT THE PFLO. THE SIXTH NF CONFERENCE CONFIRMED THE NF'S SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, WHICH CERTAINLY INCLUDES THE PFLO. WE BELIEVE EXCESSIVE CONCERN ABOUT THE BRITISH DRAGGING THEIR FEET, THE IRANIANS' LIMITED OBJECTIVES AND JORDANIANS' LACK OF ENTHUSIASM BEGS THE QUESTION. WE MUST KEEP OUR ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT PFLO COULD NOT EXIST MILITARILY OR POLITICALLY WITHOUT THE PDRY.

4. KUWAIT PROVIDES AID TO THE PDRY FOR CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROJECTS, USUALLY IN THE AGRICULTURAL/EDUCATIONAL CATEGORY. THE GOK PROVIDES THIS AID IN THE BELIEF THAT IT OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE TO BLOC AID, AND THAT FULL STOMACHS, SCHOOLS AND MOSQUES WILL BENEFIT

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THE PEOPLE, NOT THE NF. WE RECOGNIZE THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS RELEASES FUNS FOR ACTIVITIES SUCH AS SUPPORT OF THE PFLO AND TAKES PRESSURE OFF THE NF. THE KUWAITIS ALSO RECOGNIZE THIS AND ARE WILLING TO COORDINATE THEIR AID PROGRAM WITH OTHER ARAB STATES IN A "CARROT-STICK" APPROACH. THEY HAVE NOT HAD MUCH OF A RESPONSE TO THIS APPROACH BECAUSE THE SAUDIS, PRINCIPALLY, CONSIDER KUWAIT BEYOND THE PALE. THE KUWAITIS ARE NOT GIVING ADVICE TO THE PDRY, BUT THEY ARE NOT SO "HEAD-IN-THE-SAND" LIBERAL NOT TO RECOGNIZE

WHAT A SUCCESS IN DHOFAR WOULD MEAN TO THE GULF. THE ONLY THING THEY HAVE IS MONEY. THEY DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO THE "STRINGS ATTACHED" TYPE OF SITUATION WITH THE PDRY UNLESS IT HAS ARAB-WIDE SUPPORT BECAUSE THAT WOULD DAMAGE ANY POLITICAL ADVANTAGES THEIR MONEY MIGHT BRING.

5. AS WE VIEW IT, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO CONSENSUS ABOUT WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE PDRY. ACTUALLY THE PDRY, WHICH IS WORKING TO ESTABLISH CLOSER TIES WITH GULF STATES, APPEARS MORE DYNAMIC THAN THOSE WHO WANT TO CLIP ITS WINGS AND FORCE IT TO STOP ITS AID TO THE PFLO. OMAN AND KUWAIT BARELY TALK AND THE SAUDI-EGYPTIAN APPROACH WAS NOT COORDINATED. ALTHOUGH KUWAIT BEARS THE MOST OPPROBRIUM FOR ITS POSITION VIS A VIS PDRY, IT AT LEAST BELIEVES, HOWEVER MISGUIDED THIS BELIEF, THAT IT IS DOING SOMETHING POSITIVE, AND IS WILLING TO COORDINATE ITS POLICY WITH ANYONE WHO WILL STAND UP AND BE COUNTED. LIKE THE KUWAITIS, THIS EMBASSY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ISOLATING THE PDRY IS THE ANSWER. WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT THE ANSWER IS, BUT CERTAINLY A DIALOGUE OF THE CONCERNED STATES SEEMS IN ORDER.

6. THE ARAB LEAGUE APPROACH HAS FAILED BECAUSE THE PDRY DOES NOT CONSIDER ITSELF A PARTY TO THE DISPUTE. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT A NEW APPROACH IS REQUIRED. THE KUWAITIS, WHO HAVE THE BEST RELATIONS OF THE FOUR CONCERNED STATES (OMAN, SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT AND KUWAIT) WITH THE PDRY COULD PLAY A VALUABLE ROLE. IF THE FOUR COULD GET TOGETHER AND FORM A COORDINATED POLICY OF AID AND ASSURANCES IN RETURN FOR WITHDRAWAL OF PDRY SUPPORT FOR THE PFLO, KUWAIT COULD BEST BROKER THIS DEAL. WITH THE PDRY BROUGHT BACK INTO THE ARAB MAINSTREAM AND THE SULTAN'S DHOFAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM MOVING APACE, THE CHANCES FOR WINDING UP THE DHOFAR REBELLION WOULD SEEM GREATER. NF REVOLUNTIONARY ZEAL WILL NOT DRY UP OVERNIGHT, BUT IF IT IS OFFERED ARAB ALTERNATIVES, ITS MORE NATIONALISTIC ELEMENTS ARE LIKELY TO SPEAK UP. THE NF IS NOT

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A MONOLITH, BUT UNTIL NOW NO GROUP HAS HAD AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE BLOC AND TO THE RHETORIC OF THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGUES. A MEANINGFUL, COORDINATED APPROACH OFFERS THAT ALTERNATIVE AND THE USG COULD PLAY A ROLE BY POINTING THIS OUT TO THE FOUR ARAB STATES AND ENCOURAGING THEM TO PUT ASIDE DIFFERENCES IN ORDER TO PUT AN END TO THIS CONFLICT.

7. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS DISCUSS POSSIBLE NEW USG INITIATIVES, PERHAPS THROUGH THE GOK, WITH AMBASSADOR STOLTZFUS WHO CURRENTLY IS IN THE WASHINGTON AREA ON HOME LEAVE.
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